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Abstract. 
Purpose: The article studies the issue of the EU international identity as well as the values this identity is 
constructed on. The article emphasizes the importance of this identity both from theoretical and from practi-
cal perspectives, and claims that the liberal democracy governance model makes up the foundation of the 
EU identity. Methods: theoretical and methodological basis of this article is made up by the concepts of so-
cial constructivism, European constitutionalism and new institutionalism. Discussion: provides new per-
spective regarding the essence of the EU international identity, its importance for the EU performance at the 
international arena as well as the role that institutions are considered to play for identity formation. Moreo-
ver, the article offers the analysis of Normative Power Europe as the major explanatory concept for EU rela-
tions with third countries and studies the values that the EU identity is constructed on. 
Key words: European Union, social constructivism, international identity, liberal democracy, multi-level 
governance.  
 
Introduction. This article deals with both the 
EU’s international identity and the values that are at 
the core of this identity. The discourse deals with 
the premises of the EU’s international performance 
and its democratic qualities. Moreover, it appeals to 
the foundations of the entire EU project, revealing 
the roots of the contemporary phenomena that are 
in the focus of modern EU studies. The article con-
sists of two sections, which correspondingly deal 
with the EU international identity and the values it 
is based upon. The first section begins with the im-
portance of the EU’s identity for its international 
performance and then moves to Normative Power 
Europe (NPE) as the major explanatory concept for 
EU relations with third countries. It then proceeds 
to shed light on the role that institutions are consid-
ered to play for identity formation. The second sec-
tion provides the study of the values that this identi-
ty is constructed on.  
The EU and its international identity. Tradi-
tionally, actors in international relations have been 
Westphalian-type sovereign national states. This 
type of polity has existed for centuries with rather 
clear ideas of what they are both internally and in-
ternationally. Certainly, the last two centuries have 
considerably modified both perspectives of states’ 
functions, goals and modus operandi; nonetheless, 
the basic notions of this type of polity have been 
preserved, although increasingly challenged by the 
current global transformation. The story with the 
EU is certainly different. From the landmark ECJ 
van Gend & Loos judgment claiming Community 
law to be “a new legal order of international law”, 
the EU has been converting into a new type of poli-
ty, certainly different from a state. In this sense, the 
EU’s sui generis status refers to its specific path of 
development as well as to its hybrid mode of gov-
ernance [9, p. 176]. However, the sui generis label 
does not actually add much to understanding of the 
EU, as this cliché does not answer the question of 
what it is. Neither does it facilitate a good reference 
point. 
Furthermore, the EU is a polity which is dynam-
ically evolving, with its transformation from a 
“regulatory state” into a more political union being 
one of the perspectives of this evolution. From this 
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standpoint, the EU is morphing into a system of 
multi-level governance, with decisions “made not 
by Brussels but in Brussels as well as elsewhere 
around Europe” [10, p. 85]. Thus, the EU has tradi-
tionally been conceptualised with the “often invisi-
ble touch of stateness”, implying the federal per-
spective of its evolution. Habermas considers the 
EU to be a new political form. It is neither a ’feder-
al state’ nor a ’federation’ but an association of 
sovereign states which pool their sovereignty in re-
stricted areas to varying degree, an association 
which does not seek to have the coercive power to 
act directly on individuals in the fashion of nation 
state [4, p. 5]. In the international arena, the EU is 
unequivocally recognised as being an atypical for-
eign policy actor with limited resources but with 
global ambitions. Against the background of the 
EU currently being a “third way” between national 
and international politics as well as its being a re-
cent political construct, the issue of the EU’s identi-
ty has been of utmost importance for understanding 
the essence of this polity.  
Identity is normally defined as the self-
perception of an actor; however, it may also include 
the perception that others have regarding this actor. 
In terms of EU international performance, the need 
for an identity was repeatedly stressed in the aca-
demic literature. Traditionally, identities are con-
sidered to be important for further articulation of 
interests as well as for the formation of political al-
liances. Schimmelfennig argued that “social actors 
use and exchange arguments based on identities, 
values, and norms institutionalised in their envi-
ronment to defend their political claims and to per-
suade their audience and their opponents to accept 
these claims and to act accordingly’ [13, p. 193]. 
Identity is also recognised as a property generating 
“motivational and behavioural dispositions”. 
In addition to the above theoretical reasoning, 
the formation of the EU’s own international identity 
has been of utmost importance for practical politi-
cal reasons due to the high-profile identities that the 
leading EU countries enjoy. This may result in a 
form of competition, leading to awkward and dubi-
ous situations such as the one in Egypt in the after-
math of the “Arab spring”, when the new Egyptian 
government declared that they were “too busy” to 
receive the EU High Representative; about two 
weeks later they nonetheless welcomed the UK 
Prime Minister. It is identity that often provides the 
framework for foreign policy actors, thus influenc-
ing their behaviour as well as their collective choic-
es. An illustration of this argument is the EU’s con-
sistent application of political conditionality in its 
relations with third countries since the beginning of 
the 1990s. 
An important question is what the role is that in-
stitutions play in terms of the identity formation. 
Weber considered organisations to be social con-
structs, inter alia for establishing guidelines for ac-
ceptable types of behaviour. In this sense, political 
actors organise themselves and act in accordance 
with rules and practices which are socially con-
structed, publicly known, anticipated, and accepted, 
while simultaneously shaping these rules and prac-
tices. The idea of an interconnection between insti-
tutions and political culture is also stressed by the 
understanding of institutions as being an embodi-
ment of certain conventions and customs. Regard-
ing the EU’s identity, Habermas emphasised the 
potential of the common institutions that he saw for 
the formation of “a post-national civic European 
identity”.  
For the last two decades the concept of Norma-
tive Power Europe has been offered as the major 
explanatory model for the EU’s external actions. 
Furthermore, this concept is mainly accepted by the 
EU itself in terms of its self-reflection. The intro-
duction of this concept has provoked a wide-
ranging debate regarding the nature of the EU as an 
international actor. In addition to providing an in-
teresting perspective for understanding EU interna-
tional behaviour, this concept fits with the EU qual-
ities as an international actor with limited military 
capacities, “whose power emanates from its eco-
nomic might, political unity, and a very special sys-
tem of internal co-operation”. However, this con-
cept also implies two major points to stress: the 
EU’s difference from traditional polities existing on 
“traditional Westphalian principles” and the special 
place for the universal norms of democracy, the 
rule of law and human rights for EU external per-
formance. 
Thus, this concept underlines the importance of 
the EU’s own internal order, which should be in 
compliance with the values and principles that the 
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EU promotes outside of its own territory. This ulti-
mately implies a synergy between EU’s internal 
and external identity. In other words, the EU’s 
power in international performance depends upon 
what the EU is itself. Furthermore, it is the com-
mitment to common values that has traditionally 
been viewed as one of the cornerstones of the entire 
EU project.  
The debate on the EU’s identity also requires a 
reference to the concept of “Europeanisation”, 
which is defined as “the external projection of in-
ternal solutions” [7, p. 695]. In this sense, “Europe-
anisation” is of interest as it also bridges internal 
and external aspects of the EU as a sui generis poli-
ty by outside “mirroring” of the EU fundamental 
principles. To some extent, it falls in line with a 
more general pattern of identity formation, which 
encompasses both the domestic and international 
spheres. Thus, “Europeanisation” is not limited by 
external extrapolation of these principles. As ar-
gued, the EU’s impact on its Member States has 
been an important component of the EU timescape. 
Furthermore, the “mirroring” process implies com-
pliance with these fundamental principles by both 
the EU and its Member States, which leads back to 
the debate on the EU’s own democratic qualities as 
well as to the contemporary threats to the liberal 
democracy model in such countries as Hungary and 
Poland. Thus, the concept of “Europeanisation” fo-
cuses on the fundamental principles and values that 
the EU has declared as its foundation.  
Exploring the European values. The post-
Lisbon discourse has been shifted from defining 
and justifying the existence of the EU as an interna-
tional actor towards attempts to address the ques-
tion of “Europe, to do what in the world”. Follow-
ing the key questions on the EU foreign policy 
identified by Larsen [6, p. 68], this discourse 
moved from the first one, “Is the EU constructed as 
an international actor? to the second and the third 
ones, “If it is, what kind of actor is constructed?” 
and “What kind of values is this actor based on?” 
The normative power concept implies a strong 
interconnection of the EU as a normative power 
with the promotion of values that are of universal 
validity [8, p. 57–58], as well as with the EU’s own 
politico-legal order, which is viewed as the internal 
“reference point” for its outside projection. This 
section provides insight into both of the issues in 
focus. Manners refers to nine specific values that 
the EU has been promoting in its relations with the 
outer world. They are divided into two groups of 
“core” and “subsidiary” norms. The “core” group 
includes peace, liberty, democracy, human rights, 
the rule of law, and the “subsidiary” one consists of 
equality, social solidarity, sustainable development 
and good governance. Despite criticism of the rigid 
framework of the norms that the EU “absolutely 
must promote”, in fact the totality of the “core” 
norms refers to a very specific governance mode of 
liberal democracy. Furthermore, contrasting the 
EU’s identity with that of its Member States, 
Schimmelfennig stresses that the EU’s own “thin” 
identity is “based on values and norms, and consists 
in a commitment to liberal democracy” [12, p. 220].  
Thus, the core value that the EU as a normative 
power promotes in its relations with third countries 
is the liberal democracy governance model. At the 
same time, the issue of democracy has been at the 
core of the debate concerning the EU’s own quali-
ties. Therefore, the debate on this governance mode 
simultaneously concerns both the perspectives that 
are at the core of the normative power concept. In 
terms of the EU, this debate has had its specific fea-
tures due to EU’s supra-national qualities. There-
fore, it is often connected to the issue of the legiti-
macy of EU’s own legal order. This section begins 
with the importance of a shared cultural and philo-
sophical background for the formation of common 
values. It then moves to the current EU democracy 
debate with its further interconnection with the is-
sue of legitimacy.  
The starting point here is the idea that the very 
foundation of individual and group interest is fun-
damentally rooted in their beliefs about how the 
world works and the group’s values. This approach 
echoes the Weberian understanding of the role that 
the ideas and beliefs play in terms of legitimising a 
political system [14, p. 263].
 
Weber’s triad of mo-
tives causing actors to believe in the legitimacy of 
the system includes rational, traditional and charis-
matic reasoning [14, p. 215]. Moreover, in his un-
derstanding, the violation of traditions may have fa-
tal consequences for the legality of the entire sys-
tem. Later, Jachtenfuchs elaborated the notion and 
content of shared beliefs about a “legitimate politi-
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cal order” [5] with their further interconnection 
with the constitutional perspective of the polity 
construction process. Thus, the political system has 
to comply with the “parameters established by the 
dominant institutional values”. In turn, these values 
are rooted in and derived from the cultural milieu, 
which is the ultimate source of “legitimacy” or “so-
cial appropriateness” in terms of the selection of 
particular arrangements. Extrapolating this ap-
proach to the EU context, it should be stressed that 
the liberal democracy model is today the predomi-
nant legitimating belief in the ’developed’ world’, 
shared by the political elites of the Member States, 
which set the parameters for the supra-national lev-
el of governance. 
Since the end of the 1970s, most Western de-
mocracies, including many current EU Member 
States, adopted a neo-liberal direction for their de-
velopment. The fact that the model of the democrat-
ic welfare state is the dominant model for the EU 
Member States certainly influences the vision of the 
principles underpinning the EU institutional system 
that the national political elites have. Thus, the fact 
that liberal democracy is the shared standard of le-
gitimate authority provides a powerful normative 
resource for the proponents of supranational de-
mocratisation [12, p. 230]. In other words, being a 
community, “of values and norms, in which all ac-
tors share fundamental principles of liberal democ-
racy”, Member States “externalise their domestic 
political practices and norms about democratic 
governance”, extrapolating them to the suprana-
tional level [11, p. 24]. 
Despite its similarities with a federal state, the 
EU remains a unique polity, which suggests that 
EU practices can differ from the “national-level 
versions of democracy”, thus implying the potential 
to get closer to the core ideals of democracy. In 
terms of specific EU-related approaches to perceiv-
ing a correlation between democracy and legitima-
cy, it is worth mentioning the concept of input-
output legitimacy, with input legitimacy stressing 
the procedural aspect of the decision-making pro-
cess and output legitimacy the effectiveness of the 
decisions. However, the efficiency-oriented reallo-
cation of political competences from the national to 
the supranational level “tends to devaluate tradi-
tional democratic institutions and processes” [12, p. 
230]. Furthermore, the EU’s evolution along the 
path of polity construction increasingly requires its 
own democratic legitimacy instead of reference to 
the technocratic legitimacy and indirect legitimacy 
borrowed from the Member States. Thus, the trend 
of strengthening democratic institutions at the EU 
level has been viewed as a compensation mecha-
nism. Furthermore, the enhancement of the Europe-
an Parliament’s position in the EU institutional sys-
tem was recognised as the central idea reflecting 
the commitment of the Member States to the idea of 
democratic governance.  
In search of the basic formula to adequately de-
fine standards for democratic legitimate governance 
at the supranational level, the three core principles 
put forward by Abraham Lincoln – ’government of 
the people, by the people, for the people” – have 
been recognised by most scholars [11, p. 29]. This 
formula raised an intricate debate regarding the 
(non)-existence of the European demos as a neces-
sary component for the formation of post- or supra-
national democracy [15]. This approach was coun-
tered by post-nationalism social philosophers who 
were promoting a “thin” political identity detached 
from the nation in contrast to the “thick” eth-
no‐nationalism identity. Thus, democracy has 
been detached from the nation state by shifting the 
emphasis towards the notion of “deliberative de-
mocracy”, which focuses on due deliberation dur-
ing the decision-making process. In other words, 
following legitimate procedures was reasserted as 
an important factor of its own. This trend reaf-
firmed the idea of post-modern social philosophers 
of democracy lying at the core of legitimacy [3]. 
Furthermore, in a wider context, democracy today 
is conceived as “a legitimation principle which lays 
out the conditions necessary for finding out what 
constitutes the “common interest” and, more gener-
ally, a community or common identity” [11, p. 32]. 
The rather innovative concept of ’demoi-cracy’ 
offers a new look at the EU as a polity “evolving on 
the basis of mainly nationally constituted demoi” 
[1, p. 2]. Thus, “[a] democracy consisting of only 
one people has one pouvoir constituant and several 
pouvoirs constitués (parliament, executive, etc.). … 
A demoi-cracy “has several pouvoirs constituants, 
i.e., constitutive member statespeoples, and also 
several pouvoirs constitués”. According to Schim-
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melfennig et al., this fact “does not only affect gov-
ernment activity, but the constitutional structure of 
statehood” [1, p. 3-4]. Nonetheless, this concept 
suggests that the democratic qualities of the EU 
should be assessed “on the balance between, and in-
teraction of, the political rights of individuals and 
those of the democratically constituted statespeo-
ples” [2, p. 340]. Thus, it nonetheless stresses the 
liberal democracy “core” of the concept, despite the 
innovative angle on the EU provided. 
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Мета: у статті досліджується проблематика міжнародної ідентичності ЄС та цінностей, що 
складають основу цієї ідентичності. У статті підкреслюється важливість цієї ідентичності як з 
теоретичної, так и з практичної точок зору. Також стаття стверджує, що основу ідентичності 
ЄС складає ліберально-демократична модель урядування. Методи: теоретичну та методологічну 
основу статті складають концепції соціального конструктивізму, європейського конституціоналіз-
му, та нового інституціоналізму. Дискусія: висвітлює нові перспективи тлумачення сутності між-
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народної ідентичності ЄС, її важливості для зовнішньополітичної діяльності ЄС та роль інститу-
цій в формуванні цієї ідентичності. Більш того, у статті пропонується аналіз концепції Норматив-
на Сила Європа, яка є однією із головних концепції щодо розуміння сутності відносин ЄС із третіми 
країнами, та аналіз тих цінностей, які покладається в основу міжнародної ідентичності ЄС. 
Ключові слова: Європейський Союз, соціальний конструктивізм, міжнародна ідентичність, лібе-
ральна демократія, багаторівнева система врядування. 
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Цель: в статье исследуются проблематика международной идентичности ЕС и ценностей, ко-
торые составляют основу этой идентичности. В статье подчеркивается важность этой иден-
тичности как с теоретической, так и с практической точек зрения. Также в статье утверждает-
ся, что основа идентичности ЕС составляет либерально-демократическая модель управления. Ме-
тоды: теоретическую и методологическую основу статьи составляют концепции социального кон-
структивизма, европейского конституционализма и нового институционализма. Дискуссия: иссле-
дуются различные аспекты феномена международной идентичности ЄС, ее важность для внешне-
политической деятельности ЕС, а также роль институции в формировании этой идентичности. 
Более того, в статье предлагается анализ концепции Нормативная Сила Европа, которая является 
одной из главных концепций толкования сути отношений ЕС с третьими странами, и анализ ценно-
стей, которые составляют основу международной идентичности ЕС. 
Ключевые слова: Европейский Союз, социальный конструктивизм, международная идентич-
ность, либеральная демократия, многоуровневая система управления.  
 
